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John Warner
12-10-61

**Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Tuesday - 12 September 1961**

Page 1

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13. (Internal Use Only - JGC) Met briefly with Alfred Nittle, HCUA, to pick up a book written by [REDACTED] who has been cooperating with the Committee, is suffering from ulcers and is badly in need of employment. Nittle indicated further that they feel the matter of finding employment for him is a Committee responsibility.

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SIGNED
JOHN F. WARNER
Legislative Counsel

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cc: IG
DD/S
Colonel
Item 13 - [REDACTED]

SECRET

CIA

W-4910

STAT

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Mr. President:

In view of your great concern over future facets of the cold war and because of your great interest in unorthodox and intelligence operations as a means of combatting further encroachment of the Free World, I believe that the enclosed articles which recently appeared in the "Hartford (Connecticut) Courant" might be of some interest to you, inasmuch as they provide the background for some rather important intelligence operations conducted under the stewardship of General William J. Donovan during World War II.

The success attained in World War II by these clandestine operations is well known to Ambassador Bruce and Secretary Goldberg.

Respectfully,

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The Hartford Courant

SUNDAY, JUNE 4, 1961

Part
EB

America's Intelligence Dilemma: Part II

Ex-OSS Officer Puts Blame for U.S. Failures on CIA

Sees Need
For Change
As Critical
Fears Ineptness
Security Threat

By MAJ. MAX CORVO

(This is the last of a series of two articles in which Maj. Corvo, Middletown newspaper editor who was chief of secret intelligence forces in Italy during World War II, evaluates the record of the CIA in the light of wartime experience of the OSS. Maj. Corvo, cited by the Army as the originator of a force to work secretly behind enemy lines, served directly under Maj. Gen. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, chief of the OSS.)

The end of World War II raised the curtain on an era of half-peace-half-war, and set the stage for the most titanic struggle of political philosophies that has ever visited the earth.

The hardships and privations of World War II struck a sympathetic chord in the heart of America, which generously responded to the needs of the world in an outpouring of food, goods and money for the less fortunate nations.

This generosity was neither tempered nor premeditated — it aimed solely at helping those nations who through the war years had been visited by untold suffering, privation and destruction.

The era of good feeling was still soon for the war was hardly over when the Soviets began to sow a certain of suspicion and hate upon nations still nursing their wounds from the conflict against Nazism.

Ill-prepared to meet with a philosophy of mass cunning, deceit and clandestine infiltration, the West had already lost the first phase of the struggle when the Balkans, Central Europe and the Balkans had disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.

New at the helm as freedom's spokesman, the United States faltered in indecision, post-war readjustment and futile efforts to arbitrate, while in the East the



UPRISING: Photo taken during World War II shows Italian patriots at height of uprising against German and Fascist forces. With OSS guidance, the civilian fighters were able to

strike at hundreds of strategic points, take control of wide areas and demoralize the Nazi Wehrmacht. In 1941, American intelligence agents failed to bring similar results in Cuba.

Allen W. Dulles as deputy director of the organization. Quickly after the fall of Dienbienphu, thus postponing, to our detriment, any action in that part of the world.

It failed again in June 22, 1956, to take advantage of the uprising in Poland and on October of that same year it stood helplessly by and watched the slaughter.

It was caught short on October 4, 1957, when the Soviets launched their first Sputnik. In 1958 it gave no alert on the military uprising in Algeria and even less warning of the murder of pro-Western King Faisal of Iraq.

It compounded many errors in its assistance to Castro and its series of setbacks to this nation's barbudos in their Communist foreign policy and practice.

While it was true that Allen's record when on May 1, 1960, Dulles headed the OSS desk in it permitted the flight of the USSR from November, 1942, over Russia.

It must be conceded that this is a record of failures, but despite this the Dulles "stewardship" of the CIA has been successful in originating and implementing its own versions of U.S. foreign policy — often with disastrous consequences to our national prestige.

It has also been eminently successful in enlisting the support of the Executive Branch of the Government in order to cover its tracks from Congressional scrutiny.

Such a reappraisal cannot overlook other basic shortcomings which have materially contributed to the various costly failures that have plagued our government in recent times. One of the glaring shortcomings is the stop-gap nature of our national policies which have often been adopted under constant communist pressures and have prevented the formulation of long-range plans, thus forcing Washington to create a number of mushrooming agencies which have:

a) Expanded beyond their assigned missions.

b) Sown the seeds of administrative confusion.

c) Arrogated the powers of other agencies.

Unless a trim-back of personnel is effected, and lines of administrative authority are unscrambled, it will be next to impossible to create the governmental

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trained society of helping those nations who through the war years had been visited by untold suffer-

ing, privation and destruction. The era of good feeling was over when the Soviets began to assert a certain of suspicion and hate upon nations still nursing their wounds from the conflict against Nazism.

Ill-prepared to just with a philosophy of mass cunning, deceit and clandestine infiltration, the West had already lost the first phase of the struggle when the Baltic, Central Europe and the Balkans had disappeared behind the Iron Curtain.

New at the helm as freedom's spokesman, the United States wallowed in indecision, post-war readjustment and futile efforts at arbitration, while in the East the Chinese Communists, with Stalin's help, took over the ancient land to lower yet another curtain against the West.

New Tactics Needed

It was obvious from the very beginning that if the Western way of life was to survive, our nation, as its leader, must adopt new tactics and that instead of waiting for events to happen, it must develop, once again, the ability to anticipate accurately the moves of the Communist world and then act with decision and conviction.

Accordingly, in 1947, Congress authorized the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, an executive organization which was to act as the eyes and ears of the free world in all corners of the globe.

Based on Gen. Donovan's recommendations, CIG, as it was first known, was activated by President Truman who placed Gen. Lloyd S. Vandenberg as its first director. Vandenberg was, however, awaiting assignment as Air Force Chief of Staff, and his assignment to the intelligence organization was simply a lay-over appointment.

Personnel for the organization was drawn chiefly from OSS left-overs who envisaged a long career service with fat pensions at the end of the rainbow.

Vandenberg was succeeded by Adm. Roscoe Hillelkoetter, whose stay at Central Intelligence was ineffectual, except that during his term of office the Communists betrayed the invasion of South Korea.

CIA Caught Short

Ill-prepared and caught short by the sudden onslaught of the North Korean forces, CIA was not able to forewarn our government of the impending invasion. The situation was further complicated when the Chinese Red Vol. untiers swarmed across the Yalu without warning and caused one of the tragic retreats of American armed forces.

Adm. Hillelkoetter went back to sea, and on Aug. 18, 1950, not properly function. In this it President Truman called upon Gen. Walter Bedell Smith to take over the organization.

Smith, who Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, was then in command of the First Army with headquarters on Governors Island, New York, was reluctant to take the assignment. After a number of meetings and a little prodding, he was prevailed upon to accept the responsibility.

Soon after taking over as director, Gen. Smith appointed,

auxiliaries of the nation were being handled by members of the same family. Eisenhower brushed aside the protests, and the stage was set for the most calamitous series of setbacks in this nation's history.

While it was true that Dulles headed the OSS desk in Switzerland from November, 1942, until the end of the war, and was thus eminently placed in a position of delicate rapport with the Germans, it was also true that during his State period Dulles ran an intelligence operation in which many double agents were involved and in the running of which he delegated authority to persons picked up in the field without the benefit of security clearance.

Not What Was Needed Geographically cut off from the Allied Headquarters, he operated in an autonomous manner, often working at cross purposes with other geographic desks. A level operator, he found little time to supervise his people. He spent much of his time moving in diplomatic circles and with wealthy expatriates who then crowded the hotels, bars and embassies of Bern.

With this type of background, but with fanfare about his achievements, he came to CIA, technician rather than a top-level operator, for this was a critical period for American intelligence. Pitted against the far-flung operations of an efficient MKD, the CIA has failed to be this nation's strong right arm in a time of critical need for unorthodox techniques.

Events since 1933, when Dulles assumed the post as director of CIA, attest to the shortcomings of the organization's mission to provide proper intelligence upon which U.S. foreign policy could have been soundly based. This failure is in great measure responsible for the policy muddle of the last eight years, and the consequences are now being reaped by the Kennedy administration in a series of rebuffs and defeats which have managed to bring our international prestige to an all-time low.

One of the primary tasks of Central Intelligence was to keep the Communists off balance, to bring our international prestige to an all-time low.

It was the task of Central Intelligence to place penetration agents in key spots not only behind the Iron Curtain, but also in other nations so that Washington could be quickly informed of all important happenings. This was not done.

It was further the task of Central Intelligence to help implement our foreign policies in areas where orthodox diplomacy could not properly function. In this it failed to take advantage of the opportunities ever offered the West to stir up trouble within the Communist hierarchy.

It failed to take advantage of the uprising of East Germans on the morning of June 17, 1953, and failed to implement a remedy.

on the murder of pro-Western King Faisal of Iraq.

It compounded many errors in 1950 when it gave aid, comfort and assistance to Castro and his barbedos in their Communist takeover of Cuba, and it capped its record when on May 1, 1960, it permitted the flight of the 1-2 over Russia.

It must be conceded that this is a record of failures, but despite this the Dulles "stewardship" of the CIA has been successful in originating and implementing its own versions of U.S. foreign policy — often with disastrous consequences to our national prestige.

It has also been eminently successful in enlisting the support of the Executive Branch of the Government in order to cover its tracks from Congressional scrutiny.

While it protected itself from Congress, the CIA has relied to a great extent on uncontrolled foreign intelligence networks in order to secure sensitive intelligence, and in so doing has not only divulged objectives, but has failed to develop its own controlled sources of information.

'Biggest Bloop'

On April 18, disregarding all maxims of unorthodox warfare, Central Intelligence launched its biggest blunder when it resorted to a massive overt operation in an effort to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro with the aid of Cuban expatriates.

In charge of the operation were men with little experience in both political and clandestine operations. The person placed in direct charge of the operation fit the mental mold over a long period of time — a record of failures within the CIA.

Too large an effort to be screened from Castro's intelligence service, there is little question that a number of penetrations were made by pro-Castro elements. In addition, the entire operation was an open secret to everyone but the people on Capitol Hill and officials in the government.

Cautioned by certain members of the press who had access to information, Allen Dulles is re-

other basic shortcomings which have materially contributed to the various costly failures that have plagued our government in recent times. One of the glaring shortcomings is the sloppiness of our national policies which have often been adopted under constant communist pressures and have prevented the formulation of long-range plans, thus forcing Washington to create a number of mushrooming agencies which have:

Expanded beyond their assigned missions.

Sown the seeds of administrative confusion.

Arrogated the powers of other agencies.

Unless a trim-back of personnel is effected and lines of administrative authority are unscrambled, it will be next to impossible to create the governmental organizations to cope with Russia's clandestine offensive programs.

Taylor Has Work Cut Out Working to unravel the confusion, the obvious organizational shortcomings and the future requirements of this nation in a field which at best is highly complex and overcrowded with prima donnas, Gen. Maxwell Taylor has his work cut out for him. Taylor was appointed by President Kennedy to conduct a two-month inquiry into the over-all intelligence picture.

It is hoped that out of this inquiry a new sense of direction can be found and that our nation, possessing many untapped sources of talent, may embark on a dynamic program which will create as many problems for the Communist world as it has created for us.

It is also hoped that in the attainment of our national goals, whatever they may be, that the sense of political purism which at present prevails, will be stored away until such time as a world unfettered from the menace which hangs over it, can afford the luxury of purism.

Unless such an attitude is adopted by the White House, it will be impossible to achieve any appreciable success in the field of clandestine operations against the Communist world, which observes no rules and is guided by the sole objective of world domination.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE <i>Cuba</i>
TO: <i>Lawrence Houston</i>		
ROOM NO. <i>221</i>	BUILDING <i>East</i>	
REMARKS: <i>No action being taken on this</i> <i>Hbl</i> <i>GP</i>		
FROM: <i>W. L. Pforzheimer</i>		
ROOM NO. <i>1348</i>	BUILDING <i>M</i>	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO : 1957-O-439445 (47)

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